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Agents on the Web
Philosophical
Agents 
T he improvements in Internet-based softwareagents that are under way at many labora-tories and corporations are fulfilling the
promise of personalized, friendly Web services. The
improvements come at a cost, however — greater
implementation complexity. Thus, as we gradually
rely more on the improved capabilities of these
agents to assist us in networked activities such as
e-commerce and information retrieval, we also
understand less about how they operate.
Abstraction is the technique we use to deal with
complexity. What is the proper kind and level of
abstraction for complex software agents? We think
it will be reasonable to endow agents with a phi-
losophy. Then, by understanding their philoso-
phies, we can use them more effectively.
For example, consider future NASA missions. As
they become longer, more complicated, and farther
away, the software systems controlling them will of
necessity become larger, more intricate, and increas-
ingly autonomous. Moreover, the missions must
succeed in the face of uncertainties, errors, failures,
and serendipitous opportunities. While small, well-
specified systems with limited types of known
external interactions can be proved correct, consis-
tent, and deadlock-free via formal verification, such
conditions do not hold for network-based systems.
We will basically have to trust the systems, so there
should be a principled basis for our trust.
Global System Coherence
An agent-based approach is inherently distributed
and autonomous, but when the communication
channels that link the agents are noisy or band-
width-constrained, the agents will have to make
decisions locally, which we hope will be coherent
globally. We can trust the agents to act
autonomously if they embrace ethical principles
that we understand and with which we agree.
To endow agents with ethical principles, we as
developers need an architecture that supports explic-
it goals, principles, and capabilities (such as how to
negotiate), as well as laws and ways to sanction or
punish miscreants. Figure 1 illustrates such an agent
architecture that can support both trust and coher-
ence, where coherence is defined as the absence of
wasted effort and progress toward chosen goals. 
The lowest level of the architecture enables an
agent to behave reactively, that is, react to imme-
diate events.  The middle layers are concerned with
an agent’s interactions with others, while the high-
est level enables the agent to consider the long-
term effects of its behavior on the rest of its soci-
ety.  Agents are typically constructed starting at
the bottom of this architecture, with increasingly
more abstract reasoning abilities layered on top.
Awareness of other agents and of one’s own
role in a society, which are implicit at the social
commitment level and above, can enable agents to
behave coherently. Tambe et al.1 have shown how
a team of agents flying helicopters will continue
to function as a coherent team after their leader
has crashed, because another agent will assume the
leadership role. More precisely, the agents will
adjust their individual intentions in order to fulfill
the commitments made by the team.
If the agents have sufficient time, they can nego-
tiate about or vote on which agent should become
the new leader.  When time is short or communica-
tion is not allowed, the agents can follow mutually
understood social conventions, such as “the agent
with the most seniority becomes the new leader.” 
Ethical Abstractions
Ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with
codes and principles of moral behavior.2 Most eth-
ical theories distinguish between the concepts of
right and good:
 right is that which is right in itself; 
 good is that which is good or valuable for
someone or for some end. 
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The German philosopher, Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804), defined the “categor-
ical imperative” as an absolute and uni-
versal moral law (of the form “Do this”)
based entirely on reason (as distin-
guished from his “hypothetical impera-
tive,” which is based on desire: “Do this
if you want that”). We can state the cat-
egorical imperative in relation to agent
behavior as follows: “Agents should act
as if the maxim of their action were to
secure through their will a universal law
of nature.” It provides a source of right
action. For example, breaking a
“promise” is not right, because if all
agents did it, the system they support
would not function. 
Kant’s categorical imperative does
not contain a way to resolve conflicts
of duty. Less stringent formulations
specify prima facie duties, which do
not bind agents absolutely but instead
hold generally: “All other things being
equal, keep your promises.”
So-called deontological theories, like
Kant’s, emphasize “right before good.”
They oppose the idea that the ends can
justify the means, and they place the
locus of right and wrong in autonomous
adherence to moral laws or duties. These
theories distinguish intentional effects
from unforeseen consequences. That is,
an action is not wrong unless the agent
explicitly intends for it to do wrong. This
legitimizes inaction, even when inaction
has predictable but unintended effects.
For example, consider a NASA deep-
space probe in which an agent is respon-
sible for managing communications
with ground control. The agent would
not be wrong to shut down the commu-
nications link for diagnostics, even if
that severed communications of other
agents with ground control.
In contrast, teleological theories
choose good before right: something is
right only if it maximizes the good; in
this case, the ends can justify the
means. In teleological theories, the
correctness of actions is based on how
the actions satisfy various goals, not
the intrinsic rightness of the actions.
Choices of actions can be comparison-
based or preference-based.
Egoism is an ethical theory parallel
to utilitarianism: the utilitarian holds
that action should maximize the uni-
versal good of all agents; the egoist
holds instead that action should max-
imize self-interest. Both theories are
teleological, in that they hold that the
right thing to do is always to produce
a certain good, where good may be
interpreted in various ways:
 pleasure, in which case it is called
hedonism;
 preference satisfaction, called micro-
economic rationalism (assumes each
agent knows its preferences);
 interest satisfaction, called welfare
utilitarianism; and
 aesthetic ideals, called ideal utili-
tarianism.
What agents need to decide actions are
not just universal principles (each can
be stretched) and not just conse-
quences, but also a regard for their
promises and duties. They have prima
facie duties to keep promises, help oth-
ers, repay kindness, and so on. 
In the context of a NASA mission,
an agent could repay a kindness to
another agent by offering, without
being asked, to donate some resource
such as excess battery power that it
has been allocated but does not need.
Imagine that the receiving agent
already has enough battery power to
accomplish its task, but that the addi-
tional power gives it an extra safety
margin. There is no ranking among
these duties, which are highly defeasi-
ble. For example, an agent on a NASA
deep-space probe might find it accept-
able to monopolize a communication
channel to ground control to the detri-
ment of other agents because it values
the success of its task without regard
to the consequences for other agents. 
Machine Ethics
Isaac Asimov proposed a moral
philosophy for intelligent machines in
1940. His collection of short stories, I,
Robot ,3 included a Handbook of
Robotics that defined three Laws of
Robotics. These were subsequently
augmented in Foundation and
Empire4 by the “zeroth law,” and the
four laws were rewritten as follows:
 Law 0. A robot may not injure
humanity or, through inaction,
allow humanity to come to harm.
 Law 1. A robot may not injure a
human being or, through inaction,
allow a human to come to harm.
 Law 2. A robot must obey the
orders given it by human beings
except where such orders would
conflict with the First Law.
 Law 3. A robot must protect its
own existence as long as such pro-
tection does not conflict with the
First or Second Law.
An adaptation of these laws for a col-
lection of agents sent on a NASA
mission might be:
 Principle 1. An agent shall not
harm the mission through its
actions or inactions.
 Principle 2. Except where it con-
flicts with Principle 1, an agent
shall not harm the participants in
the mission.
 Principle 3. Except where it con-
flicts with the previous principles,
an agent shall not harm itself.
 Principle 4. Except where it con-
flicts with the previous principles,
an agent shall make rational
progress toward mission goals.
 Principle 5. Except where it con-
flicts with the previous principles,
an agent shall follow established
conventions.
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Figure 1.Architecture for a philosophical
agent. Layers of deliberation enable
socially appropriate agent behavior.
 Principle 6. Except where it con-
flicts with the previous principles,
an agent shall make rational
progress toward its own goals.
 Principle 7. Except where it con-
flicts with the previous principles,
an agent shall operate efficiently.
Distributed systems are susceptible to
deadlocks and livelocks. However, if
the system components obey these
seven philosophical principles, then
the susceptibilities would disappear,
because deadlock and livelock would
violate Principle 6. 
Nature versus Nurture
What is the source of the robust
behavior that a large collection of
philosophical agents is expected to
show? Wouldn’t a collection of agents
sharing the same philosophical tenets
be susceptible to failing en masse, par-
ticularly if they were identical copies?
The answer is no, provided the agents
are sufficiently intelligent and capable
of modifying their reasoning based on
their individual perspectives, which in
turn are a result of their experiences.
Consider the differences observed
between identical twins. Though genet-
ically identical, they develop personal-
ity differences as a consequence of their
experiences. It is the difference in expe-
rience and consequently in perspective
that precludes a monoculture of intelli-
gent philosophical agents. On the other
hand, if the agents are as dumb as pota-
toes, then the agent equivalent of an
Irish potato famine could well occur. 
In a real-world distributed environ-
ment, an agent’s perception of the
world is based on its direct experience
and the information it acquires from
others. Its perspective is a function of
its belief in its own perceptions and
what it learns indirectly from the per-
ceptions and beliefs of other agents.
Differences in perspective lead to dif-
ferences in action. Consequently, large
collections of intelligent philosophical
agents will generate the complex
redundancy of diversity and not the
simple redundancy of duplication. In
this framework, robustness is an emer-
gent property of diversity guided by a
common underlying philosophy.
Consider agents modeled on simple
ant behavior for path planning.5 This
model, in which robust complex behav-
ior emerges from simple individual
agent behavior, does not rely on any
hype about future machine intelligence.
Instead, there are five simple rules:
 Rule 1. Avoid obstacles.
 Rule 2. Walk preferentially in the
direction of pheromones; otherwise
wander randomly.
 Rule 3. When carrying food, mark
the return path to the next with
pheromone (the nest is marked
with a distinctive pheromone).
 Rule 4. When not carrying food,
pick up any food that you find.
 Rule 5. When at the nest, drop any
food that you are carrying.
The resulting paths are minimum
spanning trees that minimize the ener-
gy ants expend in gathering food.
Almost as an aside, the point is made
that ants wandering entirely off on
their own will starve or otherwise die. 
In our view, there are two critical
features to the success of this approach
to path planning:
 The number of available ants must
be sufficiently large so that ants
wandering off in the wrong direc-
tion and dying do not threaten
overall success.
 The ants must explore different
directions looking for food when
they do not detect a pheromone
path leading to it. 
In other words, the robustness of this
planning behavior derives from diverse
redundancy even though the behavior
of individual ants is quite simple and
they all follow the same principles. 
Applying Ethics
A philosophical approach to distrib-
uted system design presupposes that
the components, or agents, can 
 enter into social commitments to
collaborate with others, 
 change their mind about their
results, and 
 negotiate with others. 
However, the ethical theories we have
described are theories of justification,
not of deliberation. An agent can
decide what basic “value system” to
use under any approach.
The deontological theories are nar-
rower and ignore practical considera-
tions, but they are only meant as
incomplete constraints — that is, the
agent can choose any of the right
actions to perform. The teleological
theories are broader and include prac-
tical considerations, but they leave the
agent fewer options for choosing the
best available alternative.
All of these ethical approaches are
single-agent in orientation and encode
other agents implicitly. An explicitly
multiagent ethics would be an inter-
esting topic for study.
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